

The  
*Fredericksburg*  
Campaign

hours in the muck of a December day in 1862 sub-  
magnificent Union Army were shattered in fruitless  
the wall on the outskirts of Fredericksburg, Virginia,  
and that wall continuous sheets of musketry fire  
crashed into wave upon wave of incomparably  
marching to their death. Whatever credit may be  
shared of Northern hopes on the Rappahannock that  
well-disciplined fighting men of the Army of the  
Potomac were slaughtered as a result of inept leadership  
at Fredericksburg. They deserved a better fate!

Early studies by British authors, the full story of the  
campaign has been largely neglected. General Stephen  
B. Letcher, who was present at the battle, and his lively relating of the person-  
alities of the drama, offer a comprehensive awareness of  
the narrative is written with an assurance that comes from  
exhaustive research, and professional analysis. It is a  
masterly study of the campaign. — *They Met at Gettysburg*  
— RAPPAHANNOCK — The Fredericksburg Campaign  
from October 1862 through 1863, during which the  
Union Army under Major General Ambrose E. Burnside crossed  
the Rappahannock River and fought the Battle of Fredericksburg,  
and once again went down to a crushing and bloody  
defeat. The author, Joseph P. Cullen, a former member of  
the West Pointers who had thrown in their lot with  
the Confederates, tells the story of the campaign in a  
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THE PENINSULA CAMPAIGN 1862

THE  
PENINSULA  
CAMPAIGN  
1862

Joseph P. Cullen

McClellan & Lee  
RUGGLES FOR RICHMOND

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Church road, while McIntosh's battery tried to keep the enemy occupied. Archer's brigade pushed down the road and then deployed in the open fields to the south, with his left resting on the road. Field formed on his right and extended down to the Cold Harbor road, with Pegram's battery in support. Gregg's brigade was held in Mechanicsville as a reserve. Pender's brigade was not yet up and Branch had not appeared.

As the marching columns went forward the Federal artillery opened with an earth-shaking roar. Seeing the pressure mounting on his right, McCall rushed Kern's reserve battery of 12-pound howitzers over to support Cooper's guns. The flaming cannons tore gaping holes in the Confederate brigades, the shells screaming overhead like a pack of banshees, exploding in clouds of earth, horses, and men. Pegram's battery was quickly cut to pieces, losing forty-seven men and many horses in a matter of minutes, and McIntosh's rendered ineffective. Still they came on, flags flying bravely under the flesh-tearing hail of lead and iron. As the regiments swung out in battle formation across the open fields, the woods on the opposite bank of the creek came alive. From under the trees came the rolling clatter of musketry. A




Confederate Charge at Beaver Dam Creek

dark cloud of smoke floated upward, blotting out the late afternoon sun. The gray lines staggered and slowed as men fell like leaves in an autumn wind. But Anderson's leading regiment, the Thirty-fifth Georgia, ably supported by the Fourteenth and the Third Louisiana Battalion, somehow managed to keep going, slid down the bank, and wallowed across the swampy stream. Here they were met by the devastating fire of the "Bucktails" and two companies of Berdan's Sharpshooters on the right, the Fifth Pennsylvania in the center, and the First and Second on the left, supported by the Fourth Michigan and four companies of the Fourteenth New York. The steel ramrods clashed and clanged as cartridges were rammed down smoking barrels. Muskets were jerked to the shoulder and fired without aim into the dense smoke, as the gray ranks floundered helplessly in the thick morass. As the smoke slowly eddied away, the remnants of the Confederate regiments could be seen retreating back up the steep bank. The fire then grew intermittent and weaker as the attack on the Federal right sputtered and died.

*A. P.*  
*Col.* Pender's brigade having come up by this time, Hill sent him in to support Field on the right in an attempt to turn the Federal left down near the Chickahominy. But as the column advanced on the Cold Harbor road and turned south into the open field, it came under a withering artillery fire from Easton's battery and a section of Cooper's, stationed on the heights in the vicinity of Ellerson's Mill, where the Cold Harbor road crossed the creek. The destructive fire broke the column, and Pender lost control of his brigade. His leading regiment, the Sixteenth North Carolina, veered to the left and became mixed in with Field's regiments, not rejoining Pender until the fight was over. The Thirty-fourth North Carolina, supposed to support the Thirty-eighth, went too far to the right, thus leaving only the Thirty-eighth to make the assault at the mill. Bravely, but hopelessly, the Thirty-eighth advanced to within a hundred yards of the Union rifle-pits before the murderous fire of the Twelfth Pennsylvania forced a bloody withdrawal.

McCall, anticipating a stronger attempt to turn his left, quickly reinforced it with the Seventh Pennsylvania and Edwards's battery of six 3-inch rifles. Porter sent up Martindale's



### Battle of Mechanicsville

and Griffin's brigades, but they were held in reserve and did not enter the engagement.

The shadows on the field lengthened now as the blazing sun went down. Despite the hopelessness of the situation, Lee decided to gamble in a last desperate attempt to turn the Federal left before darkness set in. He ordered Ripley's brigade, the first of D. H. Hill's division to cross the Mechanicsville Bridge, to move quickly to Pender's support. Jefferson Davis, also on the field in his usual role of general without portfolio, so to speak, issued a similar order, unknown to Lee. Ripley, however, instead

*J. Davis - President of the Confederacy*

of proceeding to the extreme right to outflank the Federal artillery, advanced over the same exposed ground the Thirty-eighth North Carolina had used, and attacked the strong position directly in front of Ellerson's Mill, where he was literally cut to pieces. Of the 575 casualties suffered by the brigade, the Forty-fourth Georgia alone sustained 375. Darkness then mercifully put an end to the hopeless assaults.

The battle, of course, should never have been fought. It was a military zero so far as Lee was concerned. He had suffered about 1,500 casualties and achieved absolutely nothing. A high percentage of those casualties were company-grade officers and regimental staff men—men needed to command the brigades and divisions in the years to come, whom the Confederacy could ill afford to lose. Out of about 14,000 troops engaged, Lee had suffered a 10 percent loss, while Federal casualties amounted to only 391 out of a like amount engaged.

Historians and others have tended generally to blame Jackson for this costly blunder. It is true that Jackson was late and did not actually turn Beaver Dam Creek until the next morning, which seems inexcusable. The reasons for the delay—fatigued troops and Porter's alertness in destroying the bridges, obstructing the roads, and keeping patrols well forward—are just that, reasons; they cannot be used as excuses for his failure to move promptly to his assigned position. But it seems quite apparent from Jackson's official report and his communications at this time that he did not understand his mission as Lee intended it. He also had little knowledge of the area and his maps were almost useless. In his report Jackson stated: "On the morning of the 26th . . . I took up the line of march for Cold Harbor . . . crossed the Central Railroad about 10 A.M." Lee's written order instructed Jackson to "advance on the road leading to Pole Green Church, communicating his march to General Branch. . . ." That is exactly what Jackson did; he notified Branch of his position at 10 A.M. and Branch then moved out. There was nothing in Jackson's orders that stated he was to be in a specified position at a specified time. The only other instruction Lee gave him was to "bear well to his left, turning Beaver Dam Creek and taking the direction toward Cold Harbor."

coordinated properly. Gregg, Branch, and Anderson became engaged, in that order. Branch becoming hard-pressed, Hill sent Pender to his support, and then ordered Field to support Anderson. This left Archer, on the extreme right, unsupported, as he advanced alone across the open wheatfield.

Porter's artillery on the rim of the plateau opened with a terrifying roar, blasting holes in the gray lines as they advanced across the open fields to the edge of the woods bordering Boatswain Swamp. Their own artillery was practically useless. Hill had not massed it for an offensive and succeeded in getting only four batteries into action. Crenshaw's and Johnson's batteries, supporting Gregg and Branch, were quickly cut to pieces. Pegram, who had lost forty-seven men and most of his horses at Beaver Dam, was not much help to Anderson, and Braxton's battery, supporting Archer, was ineffective against the massed Union guns.

But still they advanced, through the smoke across the open fields and into the woods along the creek, only to be met by a sheet of flame as the Federal line exploded into action with a metallic roar. Stopping every few paces to load and fire, the Confederates were perfect targets as they tried to work their way down the slope to the creek by moving from tree to tree. In the hot, still air the smoke clung to the ground before lifting, and through it the muskets flashed and crackled, as the men fired blindly. The thick, sulphurous smoke became suffocating. The line wavered and stopped, as men fell writhing. In the wild confusion of the woods and swamps and smoke and noise, regimental and company commanders lost communication and control. Soon the rolling smoke disclosed men running to the rear, others crouching and covering behind the trees. Archer and Anderson finally ordered their men to lie down in an attempt to keep them on the field, as some of their regiments broke and ran. The attack fizzled and died as Hill was thrown back with heavy losses.

Longstreet wisely realized that a feint now would not help; so he ordered an all-out frontal assault on the strong Federal line. The attack hit Butterfield's and Martindale's brigades, of Murrell's division, on the Federal left, but the same circumstances applied here as in Hill's earlier attack. Longstreet reported: "In

front of me the enemy occupied the wooded slope of Turkey Hill, the crest of which is 50 or 60 feet higher than the plain over which my troops must pass to make an attack . . . on the slope of the hill was a line of infantry behind trees, felled so as to form a good breastwork. . . . The crest of the hill . . . was strengthened by rifle trenches and occupied by infantry and artillery. In addition to this the plain was enfiladed by batteries on the other side of the Chickahominy. I was, in fact, in the position from which the enemy wished us to attack him."

The batteries of which Longstreet complained were part of McClellan's train of heavy siege guns on the south side of the river. As Longstreet's troops advanced across the plain, these 20- and 30-pound Parrotts, 32-pound howitzers, and 4½-inch Rodmans opened with telling effect, tearing holes in the advancing lines. But the lines closed up and the gray-clad infantry charged on, down the steep bank and up to the creek, before the murderous fire of artillery and musketry from the surrounding slopes forced a bloody withdrawal.

Meanwhile, Jackson's force, which had the longest march in order to reach Old Cold Harbor on Lee's extreme left, had finally gotten into position. Jackson had again been delayed by "the enemy having obstructed the road . . . and adopted the additional precaution to delay my march by defending the obstructions with sharpshooters. . . ." This threw him in rear of D. H. Hill's division, which reached Cold Harbor first and took position to the left of the road, waiting for Jackson. Ewell's force, under Jackson, was also late, having taken the wrong road, and in the process of reversing itself to get back on the proper route, so obstructed the road with wagons and ambulances that most of Jackson's artillery was not in position until the decisive phase of the battle was over. Only four batteries of about thirty guns were actually engaged and, according to Colonel Crutcherfield, Jackson's chief of artillery, "among them were not enough guns of a suitable character to engage the enemy's guns. . . ."

Jackson put Ewell on Hill's right, then his own division and Whiting's division, connecting with A. P. Hill's left, and waited for Longstreet and A. P. Hill to drive the Federals across his front, according to Lee's battle plan. It soon became apparent,

quarters artisan, the black squares inked in. The table was a tripod of pine branches cut from the woods.

Soldiers once watched him as he dismounted under fire at Petersburg to pick something from the ground and place it in a tree. When he had gone, the curious men found that he had replaced a fallen baby bird in its nest.

In the heavy firing of the opening battle of The Wilderness, a courier who dashed up to Lee with a dispatch was startled to get a scolding for having mistreated his horse by riding so swiftly. Lee then took a buttered biscuit from his saddlebag and fed the hungry animal before turning his attention to the battle.

On the morning of Appomattox Lee had at least a passing thought of suicide. He said within hearing of his staff: "How easily I could be rid of this, and be at rest. I have only to ride along the line and all will be over." But in the next breath he spoke of the people of the South, their bleak future, and the need to help their recovery.

One hot Sunday morning in 1864 Lee sat in a camp chair under a tree at Petersburg, joining some neighborhood ladies at church services. The preacher was his chief of artillery, the Reverend General W.N. Pendleton. One of the onlookers was an unknown private, the future poet, Sidney Lanier, who was stretched in the grass a few yards from the commander.

Lanier observed Lee fall asleep in the chair so soundly that a fly on his forehead did not wake him, nor did enemy shells bursting a few hundred yards away.

Lee was known for his self-control, but sometimes lost his temper. Once during the battles of the Seven Days, when General Jubal Early observed that the enemy were escaping, Lee exploded, "Yes, he will get away because I cannot have my orders carried out!"

At the battle of Chancellorsville he upbraided General Dorsey Pender: "That is the way you young men always do. You

allow those people to get away. I tell you what to do, but you can't do it!"

Yet despite almost constant disobedience to his orders by general officers, some of which was certainly insubordination, Lee left rare complaints on record, and there was never a suggestion of court-martial in such cases.

Lee's military secretary once noted that the general was irritated by having to sign numerous army papers; he gave tell-tale nervous jerks of his head. The secretary, also nettled, flung down the papers in wrath. Lee said calmly, "Colonel, when I lose my temper, don't let it make you angry."

Several officers reported, in varying fashion, Lee's loss of his temper, as at Gettysburg, when General J.E.B. Stuart reported belatedly with his cavalry. One general recalled, in later life, that the commander flushed and raised his hand as if he might strike the horseman. In every version of the story, however, Lee quickly regained his calm dignity and called on Stuart to do his best in the final phase of the battle.

After the war, when Lee was president of Washington College in Virginia, a friend saw him pause in a ride down a Lexington street to greet a woman friend on the sidewalk. Lee sat Traveller with his hat and reins in one hand, graciously making small talk.

The horse reared on hind legs several times, and came to earth in response to Lee's tugs. Unaccountably, Traveller continued to rear throughout the interview, a mystery to all except the observant friend across the street, who could see the General as he slyly dug the horse with his left spur, taking the occasion to indulge a small vanity over his horsemanship.

Lee's role as a firm, but gentle, patriarch endures in family traditions, including a favorite tale of his method of sounding curfew in his home.

In postwar Lexington, when young men from Washington College or cadets from Virginia Military Institute called on Lee's daughters, the General would emerge unfailingly into the

very heavily.

SAD EIGHT, SWEET HEAVEN  
The Diary of Lucy Rebecca Buck  
From Royal, Virginia  
12-25-1861 - April 15, 1865

General Hooker's army crossed the Rappahannock River and started its drive for Richmond around Lee's left flank. Lee, minus Longstreet's corps, sent Jackson toward Chancellorsville to flank Hooker. On May 2, 1863, Jackson struck Hooker's right flank in a surprise attack. The fight continued into the night during which Jackson was wounded by his own men while retreating from reconnaissance. He was wounded in his left hand, left forearm and the third wound was three inches below his left shoulder. General A. P. Hill took command of the Second Corps but he was also wounded. The battle continued and on the fourth of May Hooker ordered a retreat. On May 6, 1863, the Army of the Potomac was back near Fredericksburg. Its march to Richmond was over.

U.S.A.

C.S.A.

Effectives	97,382	Effectives	57,352
Killed	1,575	Killed	1,665
Wounded	9,594	Wounded	9,081
Missing	5,676	Missing	2,018

Jackson's arm was amputated in the early morning of May 3, 1863, and the operation was a success. His wounds had begun to heal when he was struck with pneumonia May 7, 1863. He died May 10, 1863. Before Jackson's death, Lee asked Chaplain Lacy to carry him a message, "give my affectionate regards and tell him to make haste and get well and come back to me as soon as he can. He has lost his left arm, but I have lost my right arm."

General Franklin P. Paxton was also killed.

General Heth was wounded as were Generals Ramseur, Pender, Hoke, McGowan and Nicholls.

Generals Jackson, Hill, Heth and Paxton were said to be wounded I trust only slightly though. Oh how thankful we should feel for having been once more able to repulse the enemy in mortal conflict.

May 9, 1863

A most delicious day, so warm and so bright. Taught the children, sewed some and read some. In the afternoon Father invited us to walk down to the old "tank" with him. We went, he, Orville and Carey went on down to the river to fish while Laura, Willie and I returned through the meadows home. Stopped on the rugged wooded hill below Clifton

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and gathered some new violets and dug for "Crowfoot" for Ma. Had a pleasant walk home, sat and chatted awhile with Ma then read in *Alone* and finally went with her out on the old stile about sunset where we sat cracking nuts and watching them fixing the footbridge swept away by the high waters of the last few days. The boys came back exhibiting a little string of fish of which they seemed to be extremely proud. Mr. Berry came in before we had left the tea table—brings only a confirmation of what we had already heard of the late affair at F. Had seen General Lee's report—did not learn the list of casualties. Jackson, it is thought, is but slightly wounded.

May 13, 1863

Carey carried our letters to the office this morning and came back telling us that intelligence of Jackson's death had reached town—we did not credit it at all though. But alas!—Emma and Nellie came with sad faces and told us that it was but too true, a Richmond paper all heavily in mourning had been received in town announcing the melancholy event—though giving none of the particulars. Oh what a blow is this—our bravest and best, the most devoted and earnest in the cause in which we all have staked so much—the truest and noblest, our Christian patriot. Gone! Everyone seemed stunned by the news—and it has been a mournful day with us—nature seemed even to partake of the general gloom, for the sun although shining in a cloudless sky seemed sickly and wan. During the morning Willie Buck came over to tell us good-bye preparatory to going into the army and the Mack Erwin called and they both left together. I can't realize that dreadful story of General Jackson's death—perhaps it may be after all a mistake. I hope so.

May 15, 1863

The papers bring additional particulars of Jackson's death. I never fully believed it before, but I've read it now.

May 16, 1863

Was aroused from a sweet dream by Nellie's voice in the early dawn crying out—"get up girls! I've had news for you—the town is full of Yankees!" Not crediting the tale I turned my head to a more comfortable position on the pillow intent on resuming the thread of my dream, but she finally succeeded in convincing me that it was my duty to believe and obey her. Had not completed my toilette when I heard a knock at the front door and then the clanking of sabres as the owners were admitted. They inquired for Father and were directed to the stables, where he had gone to send the horses off to a place of concealment. The household was wide awake and stirring though not excited, Emma, Nellie, Laura and I sat down by the window to finish *Alone* and were at an interesting crisis of the fascinating narrative when the door flew back and in came two Yankees with Father. They had come to search

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June 20, 1863

At ten o'clock A. P. Hill's corps commenced marching through town and there was an immense sensation.

*Longstreet's I Corps and A. P. Hill's III Corps followed Ewell's II Corps across the Potomac into Maryland. Ewell sent his divisions (Early, Rodes, "Maryland," Stuart, and Edward Johnson) via different routes as he headed northward and east. Early's division entered Gettysburg on June 27 and passed on to York, Pennsylvania. Ewell entered Catletts, Pennsylvania, and on June 29 was shelling Federal works on the Susquehanna River when he received orders to proceed south toward Gettysburg; Lee was beginning to concentrate his forces.*

Children all went over to see troops—bad to worse. Commenced letter to Irvie. Miss Betsy White here to dinner. Mr. Berry over early in the afternoon. No news. Our army is in Maryland and Pennsylvania now though. Was working up in salt rising in the evening when a drunken soldier came into the kitchen from out in the rain—represented himself as one Captain Carey of the Madison artillery—commenced swearing, was frightened and sent for Father who came and settled him. . . . here—very lavish in presents and money to children. Amanda came over to help milk, and wash the children. Got through earlier than usual.

June 21, 1863

Pender's division passing through—bands playing and colors flying. We were on the house a long time watching them.

Ma did not get home until late—two soldiers to supper and had to go into the dairy after dark to skim milk for the sick at the hospital. There's a rumor of a battle at Upperville today. Scarce believe it though.

*J. E. B. Stuart's cavalry on the eastern side of Blue Ridge Mountains was, as stated, protecting the army's right flank. At Upperville on June 21, 1863, a fierce battle was fought. After the battle at Upperville, Stuart started on another of his famous rides behind and around the enemy's army. He cut between Hooker's army and Washington and came within sight of the city on his way to join Ewell.*

June 22, 1863

Soldiers in to breakfast early. Father walked in looking pale and excited. At table he and Ma both looked much disturbed and in reply to my question as to the news from the army he said the news of the Battle of Upperville had been confirmed and that 'was reported that Jones brigade had suffered severely in the action. After dinner Ma called me

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out and told me that dear Walter was said to have fallen. Oh!—such a shock!—it seems as if my heart had stopped beating and my limbs stiff and cold—still I did not credit the report—first news was always so exaggerated. Cousin Mary went home as soon as she heard it and we were all alone with our sorrow and suspense. In the afternoon cavalrymen coming directly from the scene of action confirmed all we had heard till there was left no room for hope. Father had written for Uncle Mack to come down as soon as he heard it and about three o'clock he and Jacque rode up to the gate. Father told him all—he did not come to the house at all, but sending Jacque with a message to Aunt L. he started immediately for Upperville to learn what he could with regard to the fight and tried to recover his body. This is what causes us such grief, to know that the dear fellow was shot and instantly killed was bad enough but to have no assurance that he might not have been mortally wounded and left in the enemy's hands to die a cruel death and then his dear form cast a mangled and disfigured heap under a pile of their own unhallowed slain—'twas distressing beyond measure. Ma and Nellie went on immediately to the mountain to stay with Aunt Letitia during Uncle M.'s absence. I do feel so much for her, poor thing!

A letter has just been brought in by a cavalryman from Cousin Horace Buck announcing poor Walter's death and tendering sympathy to his parents but giving no particulars as he had not been able to learn any himself. This destroys the very last vestige of hope. Oh!—I'm so sick!—so sad at heart!

June 23, 1863

Early after breakfast this morning they told me Uncle Mack had come. Presently Father came in and said he had recovered the poor boy's remains, which would be here in a few moments. How like a knell those words sounded!—till then I had not altogether resigned a hope that the evil tidings might be groundless or exaggerated. Now the sad truth was established beyond a doubt. And yet with this great sorrow mingled a feeling of earnest gratitude—he should have accorded us the sacred privilege of performing for him the last sad duty—his dear form should not rest in an unknown and unwept grave, but we should lay it with kindred dust where we could plant over it flowers and tend it with the loving care that we delighted to bestow upon him while he lived. I went out and gathered some beautiful jessamines, lilies, and roses and some ivy for a wreath and while twining these for his bier, Nellie came in. In a very little while the house was thronged, ladies bringing baskets of wreaths and flowers and all with sad, tearful faces. They brought dear Walter in about ten o'clock. Cousin William Cloud coming with him. I saw the black great wagon drawn slowly along and thought how often we had watched for his coming as for a ray of sunshine and had seen him dash up to the house so fearlessly looking so handsome and graceful, so noble—and now to think of his being brought so sadly, so

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as to the particulars of the struggle.

PENDER'S  
Division

On July 1, 1863, General Heth's division of A. P. Hill's corps started for Gettysburg to obtain shoes for his men. Lee had heard that the Federals were north of the Potomac but was not sure of their exact location. His "Eyes," the cavalry under Stuart, had not been heard from since the start of the ride around the enemy. Lee had begun to concentrate his forces but felt he should avoid a major battle before his entire army was up into position. Heth met strong opposition on July 1, 1863, but the III Corps with aid from Ewell's approaching corps, drove the enemy back and captured Gettysburg. The routed Federals retreated to the higher ground south of the town. The Confederates did not press their victory.

Gen. J. E. B. Stuart made contact with Lee on July 1. The enemy had already been located, the battle was on. Longstreet's corps arrived that night and on July 2 and July 3 of 1863, the high ground was stormed and the Confederate attacks were repulsed. On July 4, 1863, the Confederates prepared for an attack by Meade, U.S.A., who had taken over the Army of the Potomac from Hooker. The attack never came. Lee was stopped but his ground gained on the first day was his. July 5, 1863, found Lee's army in retreat bound for Virginia.

U.S.A.

C.S.A.

Effectives	88,289	Effectives	75,000
Killed	3,155	Killed	3,903
Wounded	14,529	Wounded	18,735
Missing	5,365	Missing	5,425

*The greatest battle ever fought in America was over. Six Confederate generals were killed or mortally wounded, three captured, and eight wounded. Armistead, Barksdall, Dale, Garnett, Pender, Pettigrew, and Semmes were the generals killed or mortally wounded. These men and the others that had already fallen were hard to replace. The South was running out of trained military leaders.*

Ma and the children came in late. Mr. Berry just before ten o'clock brought confirmation of Uncle Mack's news and the additional intelligence of Corse's brigade having been ordered into Maryland. Heaven forbid it—for Pickett's division is said to have suffered severely in this last battle.

July 8, 1863

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The Warren Rifles was Company B of the Seventh Virginia Infantry Regiment of Corse's Brigade, Pickett's Division. Corse's brigade left Gordonsville, on July 8, 1863 and began its march to and down the Valley to join the rest of Lee's army. The march took them via Madison's Courthouse and on the tenth of July they began the ascent of the Blue Ridge. The brigade left Laray on the eleventh and bivouacked on the night of July 11, 1863, at McCoy's Ford above Front Royal. Many of Lucy's friends in the Warren Rifles were permitted to visit home, but by the thirteenth the brigade was at Middletown. The march ended at Winchester where the particulars of the Battle of Gettysburg were learned. The brigade remained in Winchester until July 20 when they moved south toward Front Royal. On July 21 the brigade became engaged in the defense of Manassas Gap where it fought gallantly and helped to push back the Federal regulars.

Very pleasant. Grandma and Aunt B. spent the day in town. Looked all day for Father but he did not come. All sitting on the porch after tea when Uncle Mack came in to say Victor and Charlie Brown were at home and brought news that the Warren Rifles would all be in tomorrow en route to rejoin their division in Pennsylvania. Our joy was too deep for words mingled though it was with sadness with the thought of meeting poor Dick again. Feel so nervous and excited at the thought of their coming.

July 9, 1863

Uncle Tom came over in the afternoon and brought some papers and a letter for me from Benton—written some time since, though—on the eighteenth—had been sick. Irvie was well. No news excepting that he had been promoted to the colonelcy. We were sitting in the door after tea when Dick rode through the gate. Poor fellow!—how he struggled to be calm and how thin and pale and sad he looked. After sitting a few moments on the porch where his pa had just come, he got up and went into Grandma's room and we followed him. Then he commenced talking over his great loss and wept so sorrowfully. Lifting up his head he said "Well, I would have given my life a willing sacrifice for his!" It seemed a relief to talk... tragically and he continued with us till some time after his father left—so 'twas nearly dark when he left promising to return tomorrow. We watched him ride off from the stile as we had seen him do hundreds of times before but missed that other familiar form that was wont to accompany him. Had a note from Father by an old gentleman—a traveler in search of his nephew killed in battle. Father will be home tomorrow. Says Uncle Larue has been very ill. Dick says Scott's in town. Wonder if we shall see him. All have furrowed till Sunday morning.

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He commanded four batteries at Yorktown, Gaines's Mill, Malvern Hill, South Mountain, and Antietam. Named B.G. USV 25 Sept. '62, he led 3d Div., IX (4 Oct. '62-2 Mar. '63) at Fredericksburg and 2d Div., VII (21 Mar.-1 Aug. '63) at Hill's Point in April, when he led a storming column in a successful assault of Battery Huger. He commanded the VII Corps (15 July-1 Aug. '63) and the Army of Va. (15-20 July). He then commanded the forces at Norfolk and Portsmouth (15 July '63-14 Jan. '64) and the 2d Div., VI (25 Mar.-6 May '64) at the Wilderness, where he was severely wounded. He had been Acting I.G. of the Potomac earlier that year. At Winchester, Cedar Creek, and Fishers Hill he commanded the 2d Div., VI (6 Aug.-19 Oct. and 19 Oct.-6 Dec. '64). On 19 Oct. '64 he led VI, Army of the Shenandoah, during the siege of Petersburg; he commanded VI Potomac (16 Jan.-11 Feb. '65). Brevetted for Suffolk, the Wilderness, Petersburg (B.G. USA), war service (Maj. Gen. USA) and Winchester and Fishers Hill (Maj. Gen. USV 1 Aug. '64), he continued in the R.A. and was a member of the board that reversed Fitz-John Porter's court-martial in 1878-79. He retired in 1882 as Col. D.A.B. characterizes him as a "dignified, courteous, modest soldier," a "constant reader of military works."

GETTYSBURG, THE OLD HERO OF. See John Burns.

GETTYSBURG ADDRESS. Delivered 19 Nov. '63 by Lincoln at the dedication of the national cemetery at Gettysburg; the speech was apparently not written hastily on the train as tradition holds, but was completed in Washington, with only a few minor changes made later. After a two-hour oration by Edward Everett, the crowd applauded Lincoln's five-minute address without enthusiasm. Lincoln said to

the man who had introduced him, "Ward Hill Lamon, that speech won't scour. It is a flat failure." Although some recognized its literary quality immediately, Lincoln's political enemies belittled it.

The following version is from the second draft, which Lincoln is believed to have held at the ceremony.


"Four score and seven years ago our fathers brought forth, upon this continent, a new nation, conceived in Liberty, and dedicated to the proposition that all men are created equal.

"Now we are engaged in a great civil war, testing whether that nation, or any nation, so conceived, and so dedicated, can long endure. We are met here on a great battlefield of that war. We have come to dedicate a portion of it as a final resting place for those who here gave their lives that that nation might live. It is altogether fitting and proper that we should do this.

"But in a larger sense we can not dedicate—we can not consecrate—we can not hallow—this ground. The brave men, living and dead, who struggled here, have consecrated it, far above our poor power to add or detract. The world will little note, nor long remember, what we say here, but can never forget what they did here. It is for us, the living, rather to be dedicated here to the unfinished work which they have, thus far, so nobly carried on. It is rather for us to be here dedicated to the great task remaining before us—that from these honored dead we take increased devotion to that cause for which they here gave the last full measure of devotion—that we here highly resolve that these dead shall not have died in vain; that this nation shall have a new birth of freedom; and that this government of the people, by the people, for the people, shall not perish from the earth."

GETTYSBURG CAMPAIGN, June-July '63. After frustrating two Federal attempts to penetrate the strong defensive positions at Fredericksburg and march on Richmond, the Confederates again undertook the strategic offensive. Although some consideration was given to a plan for part of the Army of Northern Va. to go to the West for an offen-

sive under Lee's command against Rosecrans, the decision to invade the North was finally accepted by Richmond authorities. It was believed that a victory on Northern soil would strengthen the growing peace movement in the North, and that it might encourage England's intervention on behalf of the South. The Confederates wanted to shift the



fighting from Va. into the abundant Cumberland Valley. They also hoped that the invasion would relieve pressure on Vicksburg and Chattanooga by making the Federals withdraw strength from those areas to counter Lee's threat.

The Army of Northern Va. had been reorganized into the I Corps (still under Longstreet), II Corps (Ewell had succeeded Stonewall Jackson), III Corps (A. P. Hill), and Stuart's cavalry (increased to six brigades). The Army of the Potomac retained its organization of seven infantry corps and a cavalry corps. Lee's strength was 89,000 and Hooker had 122,000.

Lee started moving troops north from Fredericksburg on 3 June, and by the 8th had concentrated near Culpeper all corps except A. P. Hill's, which remained in the old positions to deceive Hooker. On 4 June Hooker, who had known for a week that Lee was preparing to undertake some movement, ordered reconnaissance operations that resulted in the battles of FRANKLIN'S CROSSING (5 June) and BRANDY STATION (9 June).

After these engagements Lee knew that Hooker was alerted as to his general intentions and might spoil his invasion plans by an attack toward Richmond. On 10 June, therefore, Ewell was started toward the Shenandoah to destroy the garrison in that area and, thereby, to force the Washington authorities to pull the Army of the Potomac back for defensive operations. Hooker, in fact, had proposed just the plan Lee was worrying about, but it had been disapproved.

Troops of Schenck's US VIII Corps (Middle Department) were guarding the Valley. B. F. Kelley's (1st) division, about 10,000, was concentrated at Harpers Ferry with B. F. Smith's brigade (1,200) at Martinsburg. Milroy's (2d) division, about 9,000, was at Win-

chester, with A. T. McReynolds' (3d) brigade (1,800) at Berryville. Late 11 June Milroy had been ordered to drop back to join Kelley; believing he could hold Winchester, he had not done so.

In moving to join Ewell, Jenkins' cavalry brigade had located and clashed with Milroy's outposts at Middletown, Strasburg, Cedarville, and along the Front Royal Road. When Ewell reached the Valley on 12 June, via Chester Gap, he split his forces. Rodes and Jenkins were ordered to BERRYVILLE and MARTINSBURG to capture the Federal garrisons. With his other two divisions (Early and Johnson), Ewell drove Milroy's outposts toward Winchester in the hope of surrounding and capturing the main Federal force there.

Due to faulty coordination between Rodes's infantry and Jenkins' cavalry, the bag of Federal prisoners at Berryville and Martinsburg was disappointing. WINCHESTER was, however, a complete Southern victory that virtually destroyed Milroy's force.

Jenkins crossed the Potomac 15 June, and Rodes's infantry followed the next day. At Williamsport they waited for Ewell's main body to catch up.

Longstreet and A. P. Hill had remained on the line of the Rappahannock to deceive Hooker. On 11 June, the day after Ewell's departure, Hooker started extending his right toward the line of the Orange and Alexandria R.R. Two days later he ordered the concentration of his army near Centreville. The next day (14 June) Hill left Fredericksburg and followed Ewell's route into the Valley. Longstreet left Culpeper 15 June and moved east of the Blue Ridge to cover the passes and confuse Hooker as to Lee's objective (Washington or Pennsylvania).

Cavalry covered the flanks of both armies; Pleasonton tried to penetrate Stuart's COUNTERRECONNAISSANCE


screen to give Hooker information of Lee's movement. This resulted in fine cavalry employment by both sides, and brought on the famous series of engagements at ALDIE, MIDDLEBURG, and UPPERVILLE.

Stuart started 24 June on his controversial Gettysburg raid. Two days before this Lee had written him: "If you find that he [Hooker] is moving northward, and that two brigades can guard the Blue Ridge and take care of your rear, you can move with the other three into Maryland and take position on General Ewell's right, place yourself in communication with him, guard his flank and keep him informed of the enemy's movements." Given the choice, Stuart decided on a route around Hooker's rear and flank, rather than the shorter, more protected one west of the Blue Ridge. He took the brigades of Hampton, Fitzhugh Lee, and W. H. F. Lee. While Stuart has been almost universally accused of poor military judgment in his conduct of this operation, a strong case has also been made in his defense. Cutting across the Army of the Potomac's main supply route, Stuart captured 125 new wagons at Rockville and, in the course of the raid, further encumbered himself with over 400 prisoners. Skirmishes took place at FAIRFAX, WESTMINSTER, HANOVER, and CARLISTE.

Ewell spearheaded the virtually unopposed Confederate movement up the Cumberland Valley. Couch, commanding the newly-created Dept. of the Susquehanna, did what little he could to organize the Federal militia units for defense of the state. W. T. H. Brooks, commanding the Dept. of the Monongahela, played a similar role on Ewell's west flank. Skirmishes took place at GREENCASTLE, MCCONNELLSBURG, and SPORTING HILL. Federal troops of Schenck's VIII Corps (Middle Department) were engaged in skirmishes with

Stuart's raiding column and Milroy's retreat.

When Hooker learned that the Army of Northern Va. had crossed the Potomac he moved into Md., concentrating his army around Frederick by 28 June. His plan was to stop Lee's invasion by cutting the vulnerable Confederate line of communications. He ordered Stocum's XII Corps to join Federal forces near Harpers Ferry and to operate against Lee's rear. When Halleck counter-



manded these orders, Hooker, who had come to feel unbearably hampered by interference from Halleck, asked to be relieved. The administration had been looking for an opportunity to replace Hooker with a minimum of political repercussion; Meade moved up from V Corps to succeed him.


Other significant events took place on 28 June. In the morning Lee, still ignorant of the enemy situation and eagerly awaiting news of Stuart, had ordered Ewell to cross the Susquehanna and seize Harrisburg. His other two corps were to move forward from around

CONFEDERATE 3 STAR GEN. A.P. Hill Commanding Officer  
OF 2 STAR GENERAL PENDER

Chambersburg and Greenwood to join Ewell. That night he received from Longstreet's mysterious agent, Harrison, a report of the true situation. Lee was forced to begin an immediate concentration around Cashtown and Gettysburg.

#### Battle of Gettysburg—First Day

Meade's strategy was to maneuver through Frederick toward Harrisburg, thereby menacing Lee's line of communications while keeping between the enemy and Washington. This also kept Federal forces disposed so they could make Lee turn and fight before crossing the Susquehanna.



A meeting engagement took place 1 July when Buford's Federal cavalry division, scouting ahead of the main forces near Gettysburg, encountered Pettigrew's brigade (Heth's division of A. P. Hill's corps) moving into Gettysburg to capture a supply of shoes reported there.

Buford recognized the importance of Gettysburg as a communications center

where Union forces were being rallied for a new stand.


Meade sent Hancock to organize the troops on Cemetery Hill and to recommend whether Gettysburg was an advantageous place to bring on a general engagement. A defensive position had been reconnoitered farther south along Big Pipe Creek but Meade did not overlook the possibility of fighting farther north. After ordering Federal positions extended to Culp's Hill, Hancock examined the terrain with Howard and Warren and then reported back to Meade that this would be the place to fight. The latter had, however, already started the movement of the army toward that place.

The first day's fighting had been a Southern victory. XI Corps had lost over 4,000 men captured, and had many "stragglers." Lee, however, was still in the dark as to his enemy's true dispositions and ordered his two corps to avoid bringing on a general engagement until Longstreet's corps could arrive.

Whether Lee should have attacked Cemetery Hill the first day is one of the great controversies of the war. Ewell, ordered to do so "if possible," did not make the attempt.

#### The Second Day, 2 July

Hancock had recognized the natural strength of the Gettysburg position. Further, he had seen the importance of Culp's Hill and had ordered troops to occupy it. A strategic weakness which Hancock reported to Meade was that the Gettysburg position could be "turned" from the northeast; that is, a Confederate attack from that direction would threaten the Federal line of communications along the Baltimore pike. This was foremost in Meade's mind as he made his troop dispositions during the night of 1-2 July. In his concern for this "strategic flank" he did not make ade-



quate provisions for the defense of the Round Tops.

Lee was also oriented in his strategic planning toward this north flank. Ewell, however, told him he could not take Cemetery and Culp's hills, and recommended that Longstreet attack the Round Tops. Longstreet was opposed to attacking at all; he advocated a defensive posture. The repeated success in repulsing Federal attacks (1st Bull Run, 2d Bull Run, Antietam, Fredericksburg) had convinced "Old Pete" that the war should be won by a policy of "strategic offense—tactical defense." But Lee was resolved to attack, and ordered Longstreet to make the main effort on 2 July against Meade's south flank.

At dawn 2 July Meade's forces were disposed in the form of a fishhook, with the tip at Culp's Hill, the hook curving around Cemetery Hill, the shank along Cemetery Ridge, and the "eye" at the Round Tops. Lee stretched around the outside of this hook, with Ewell on the north, A. P. Hill in the center, and Longstreet on the south. The Federals had not only the advantage of observa-

and organized his badly outnumbered cavalrymen to defend it. Heavy fighting started at 10. Buford's dismounted troopers, armed with the new Spencer carbines, held off the first infantry attacks of Heth and Pender's divisions (A. P. Hill) while Reynolds' I Corps and Howard's XI ("German") Corps rushed up. Federal infantry started arriving at about 10:30. The Confederates built up superior strength, captured McPherson Ridge, and pushed toward Seminary Ridge. Reynolds was killed by a sharpshooter; the famous Iron Brigade sustained casualties from which it never recovered; Archer became the first Confederate general officer to be captured since Lee had taken command; the 2d and 42d Miss. were captured by the 6th Wis. in a railroad cut on Seminary Ridge. Around noon the fighting died down while the Union forces built up their defenses and the Confederates reorganized for another attack on Seminary Ridge. XI Corps started arriving about 1 o'clock and two divisions under Schurz extended the Federal north flank while the third was posted as a general reserve on Cemetery Hill.

Ewell's corps then arrived from the north to threaten the exposed Federal north flank. Rodde's division moved along Oak Ridge and Early advanced along the line of the Harrisburg road. Union forces were moved around to meet this new threat; the Federal corps of Sickles (III) and Slocum (XII), respectively twelve and five miles away, were ordered up with all speed to strengthen the line. Ewell drove the XI Corps back with heavy losses; despite efforts to reinforce this wing, Union forces were driven back to Cemetery Hill. On Seminary Ridge the troops of I Corps, now commanded by Abner Doubleday, were put in an untenable position by the collapse of XI Corps. They withdrew also to Cemetery Hill.

tion and fields of fire, but their numerical superiority was further strengthened by a central position.

In the absence of Stuart, Lee lacked complete information of the terrain and enemy dispositions on which to base his tactical plan. This led him into the erroneous belief that the main enemy defensive line was along the Emmitsburg pike, with its flank near the Wheat Field. His plan was for Longstreet to hit this flank with two divisions (Hood on the right, and McLaws) then turn north and roll up the enemy line by an attack along the pike. Ewell and A. P. Hill were to make the secondary effort; that is, they were to attack so as to prevent Meade from shifting troops from unthreatened parts of his line to reinforce against Longstreet's main effort.

Although Lee's plan was defective, it was further jeopardized by faulty execution. Since Ewell was reluctant to attack on the north, Lee decided to reduce the overextension of his army. He told Ewell to close in on A. P. Hill's corps unless he could see some way of attacking profitably against the Federal north flank on 2 July. Ewell was reluctant to move west because it would have meant abandoning some of his seriously wounded. Also, during the evening of 1 July he had reports that Culp's Hill was unoccupied; he then decided to attack this position after all. Freeman sums up the Confederate failure at Gettysburg with: "Jackson is not here."

**The Round Tops-Sickles' Salient**

On moving to his assigned sector on 2 July Sickles went forward, without permission, to occupy some higher ground. This resulted in the formation of "Sickles' salient," which took in the soon-to-be famous spots known as the Peach Orchard, the Wheat Field, and Devil's Den.

After many delays the second day's

fighting opened about 4 p.m. with the attack of Hood's division toward the Round Tops. It was about this time that Warren saw this threat and started rushing troops to occupy Little Round Top. The 15th and 47th Ala. (Law's brigade; Hood) drifted to the right in their advance and a gap developed in Law's brigade. Three companies of the 47th Ala. were left at the base of Round Top for flank security and the rest of the Confederates—approximately 500 men, now commanded by Col. Oates of the 15th Ala.—climbed Round Top and paused to catch their breaths before turning north to cross the saddle that separated them from Little Round Top. Chamberlain's 20th Me., in the meantime, had been moving up as the advance regiment of Vincent's brigade (3, 1, V) and rushed 308 men into position on the southern side of Little Round Top. O'Rourke's 140th N.Y. was in the advance of Weed's brigade (3, 2, V), which Warren, on his own initiative, had ordered up; the lead regiment was accompanied by Lt. Hazlett's battery (D, 5th US). The attack on the Round Tops was repulsed. Vincent, Weed, O'Rourke, and Hazlett were killed. Hood was wounded early in the engagement, permanently losing the use of one arm.

In a poorly managed afternoon of gallant fighting the Confederate brigades continued to assault in sequence from the right. The attackers were enfiladed by fire from their left, and Meade was able to rush reinforcements to stop each individual brigade-size attack. Severe fighting took place in the Wheat Field, the Peach Orchard, and the Apple Orchard as Sickles' III Corps was driven back and divisions from V, VI, I, and XII Corps were rushed forward to plug the gap.


In the Confederate center Hill's failure to attack in time and with sufficient effort had enabled Meade to shift forces

from his front to reinforce the Federal left. Anderson's division on Hill's right advanced somewhat on Longstreet's left; Pender's division had remained on Seminary Ridge.

On the other end of the line, Ewell's effort had been limited until 6 p.m. to an artillery barrage that had been finally silenced by counterbattery fire from Cemetery and Culp's Hills. At about 6 p.m. he ordered his three divisions to attack the Federal north flank. These commands of Rodes, Early, and Johnson (from west to east) were separated from each other by the town of Gettysburg and Rock Creek. Early, in the center, attacked Cemetery Hill with his two available brigades (Hays and Avery). They succeeded in getting a foothold on the hill, where Federal strength had been reduced by detachments to Meade's threatened left. Ames's single brigade was driven back, losing several artillery positions; Ames managed to halt the panic and with reinforcements by Carroll's brigade (II), which moved up on his right, drove the Confederates back. Rodes's division did not get into position until the attack of Hays and Avery had been repulsed; he realized that any advance by his single, unsupported force would be futile, and did not attack. On the other end of Ewell's line only three brigades of Johnson's division got across the creek by dark. Culp's Hill, although a strong natural position further improved by earthworks, was held at this time only by Greene's brigade; the rest of XII Corps had gone to support Sickles. "Maryland" Stewart led his brigade into some abandoned trenches up the southeast slopes of Culp's Hill. The other two brigades were stopped at the base of the hill by Greene's thin line. Johnson's attack degenerated into "a random and ineffective musketry fire" (Alexander, 410).

**Third Day, 3 July**

Despite Longstreet's vehement objections, Lee was determined to attack again the third day. Morale of his troops was still high, he had gained ground favorable for attack, he had been reinforced by the arrival of Pickett's fresh division, and he had unlimited faith in the ability of the Army of Northern Va. With the benefit of 20/20 hindsight it is



apparent that Lee's judgment was faulty and that Longstreet was right. Meade, however, was so little confident of the outcome of a third day's fighting that it was only after a formal council of command that he made his decision to stay and accept battle.

Lee's plan now was to hit the center of Meade's line with 10 brigades, supported by 159 guns. Meade guessed the point of attack by the simple reasoning that Lee had previously attacked both flanks.

Early 3 July a garbled order sent Mudge's 2d Mass. and Colgrove's 27th Ind. into a gallant but hopeless charge against the three brigades of Johnson

*Shows that the ST/II outcome of a third day's fighting that was only after a formal council of command and accept battle.*

*REMOVED FROM THE FIELD OF BATTLE*

*AND REMOVED FROM THE FIELD OF BATTLE*

around the base of Culp's Hill. The Mass. regiment lost its colonel, four color bearers, and 250 men. The Confederates made one more attempt to take Culp's Hill, but were repulsed by the now-reinforced defenders with heavy losses by 10:30.

The day which had dawned sultry became oppressively hot as the sun burned through the haze at about noon. Federal troops, who had worked feverishly throughout the night to improve their defenses and to get final reinforcements into position, literally rested on their arms.

Under Longstreet's unenthusiastic direction Pickett formed his own troops and then directed the placing of the brigades coming up from other divisions for the attack. The formation of the 10 attacking brigades may be shown as follows.

PETTIGREW	PICKETT
Mayo	Davis
Marchall	Fry
Garnett	Kemper
Trimble	Wilcox
Lane	Lowrance
	Armistead

The names shown above are those of the officers actually commanding during the attack; division commanders are shown in capital letters. Although Pickett's division was fresh, the two on his left had been badly disorganized in the fighting of the first two days; only Lane's brigade "was in the keeping of a Brigadier of tested combat experience" (*Lee's Lts.*, III, 150). Trimble took command of his two brigades only as they were actually moving into position. In an error that proved fatal, these two brigades (Lane and Lowrance) were not placed in echelon to the left behind Pettigrew's exposed flank, as had been directed.

There is no good reason why this famous operation has inaccurately been called "Pickett's Charge." Longstreet was in command. Pickett's only over-all responsibility was that of forming the

brigades before the attack (which he had accomplished by about noon). Nor did Pickett's troops form the major portion of the total attacking force.

Following a heavy artillery preparation, 15,000 Confederate infantry attacked at about 1:45 p.m. Across a half mile of open field, over the plank fences along the Emmitsburg road, against a Federal force which waited behind breastworks they had improvised along the stone walls, the Southerners moved in tight formation. Although Federal artillery opened up, Union infantrymen did not fire. Lee's men halted a few hundred feet from the enemy and dressed their lines. Then began the final assault.

The "little clump of trees," located near a part of the line known as "the Angle," was the point on which Fry's brigade advanced, and those on either side guided on him.

Even when they got within range of canister, Pickett's men maintained their formations and advanced, as did the right brigades of Pettigrew's division. On the left, however, the brigades of Davis and Mayo began to show hesitation. While Garnett, Kemper, Armistead, Marshall, and Fry converged on the little clump of trees, followed by the brigades of Lowrance and Lane, the Confederate left began to collapse and then to pull back. The 8th Ohio, poised as skirmishers in an advanced position, brought a demoralizing enfilade fire to bear. Hand-to-hand fighting broke out as Armistead led the advance through the angle. Alonzo Cushing, already wounded three times, rolled a gun down to the stone wall and died directing its fire at point-blank range. Armistead was killed. Federal reinforcements rushed into the melee from adjacent parts of the line and the Confederate advance was stopped. The "high tide of the Confederacy" then began to recede, leaving 19 regimental colors in Federal hands.

Stannard led a counterattack with part of his (New) Vt. Brig. against the right of the Confederate penetration and hastened their withdrawal.

There was demoralization but no general panic. Longstreet rallied the retreating Confederates and started reorganizing them for the expected counter-offensive. A few Federal skirmishers did start forward, but were driven back by artillery.

The next day, the Fourth of July, Lee awaited an attack. Early in the afternoon it began to rain, and by evening there was a deluge. Aided by weather that made pursuit difficult, Lee then began his retreat.

It was not until years after the Civil War that historians started pointing to Gettysburg as the turning point. (Anticlimax is considered by many to deserve this distinction.) As Lee's survivors trudged south they could console themselves with the thought that they had won the first two days and lost the third; as was the case after Antietam, the Army of the Potomac was too badly hurt to administer the knock-out.

#### Cavalry Actions

Stuart reached Gettysburg the afternoon of 2 July. By noon of the 3d he was on the north flank two and a half miles east of Rock Creek. While the infantry charge took place, Stuart was trying to cut Meade's line of communications along the Baltimore Pike. Opposing him was David McM. Gregg, commanding the cavalry brigades of J. I. Gregg, McIntosh, and Custer. Stuart was repulsed after a heavy encounter in which both sides fought mounted and on foot.

Kilpatrick covered the other flank with the brigades of Farnsworth and Merritt. While the infantry attack was in progress, Kilpatrick ordered a senseless and suicidal attack against Hood. Hood, protected by thick woods and

stone walls, repulsed the gallant but futile attack, killing Farnsworth.

#### The Retreat

The severe storm that slowed Meade's pursuit also made the Potomac unfordable when Lee's advance guard reached Williamsport 6 July. Buford attacked Imboden here but was repulsed. The rest of Lee's army reached Hagerstown 7 July and entrenched to await replacement of the ponton bridge destroyed by Federal cavalry. Meade decided against attacking this position, and Lee withdrew across the Potomac the night of 13-14 July. Heh commanded a rear-guard action at FALLING WATERS, W. Va., the next day, in which he lost two guns, 500 prisoners, and in which Pettigrew was mortally wounded.

Livermore's figures on the three days' fighting are:

	Federal	Confederate
Engaged	88,289	75,000
Killed	3,155	3,903
Wounded *	14,529	18,735
Missing	5,365	5,425
Total losses	23,049	28,063

\* Includes mortally wounded and captured.

In the case of Federal losses, Livermore accepts the figures of the *Official Records*; Fox differs only slightly (3,070 killed; 14,497 wounded and died of wounds; 5,434 captured and missing; 23,001 total).

As for Confederate strength and losses, there is considerable disagreement. Fox puts Confederate losses at: 2,592 killed, 12,706 wounded, including mortally wounded, 5,150 captured, and missing; 20,448 total.

Covered separately in alphabetical sequence in the book are a number of battles and skirmishes which are part of the Gettysburg campaign. In the fol-